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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO RACISM?
RACHEL F. MORANt
INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, most Americans
thought they knew what racism meant. Racism was a belief that
non-Whites were inferior and that Whites should avoid social
contact with them. During the heyday of the civil rights
movement, racial segregation became the target for historic
judicial intervention, unprecedented congressional action, and
dramatic deployment of federal executive power. In Brown v.
Board of Education,1 the United States Supreme Court
unanimously condemned state-mandated segregation in public
schools that damaged the "hearts and minds" of Black children
"in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
2 Despite the Court's delay
in implementing remedies, the Justices spoke with one voice in
pronouncing that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place." 3  Congress invigorated this
vision of racial equality by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964
along with other important civil rights legislation.
4 Even before
that, when some school desegregation orders were implemented
in the South, President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced recalcitrant
state and local officials to comply out of respect for the Court's
t Robert D. and Leslie-Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California
School of Law (Boalt Hall). I would like to thank Professor Cheryl L. Wade and St.
John's University School of Law for the opportunity to participate in this 
conference
on "People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation."
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 494.
3 Id. at 495.
4 See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000
(2005)). See generally GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T.YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT
HARVARD UNIV., RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 29 fig.1 
(1999), available
at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Resegregation-
AmericanSchools99.pdf (showing that substantial desegregation of public schools
began only after passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964).
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authority.5 Norman Rockwell's image of Black children entering
school under the watchful eyes of federal marshals became agraphic statement of the nation's commitment to undo the legacy
of Jim Crow segregation.6
In the decades following the implementation of Brown,public opinion polls suggested that laws could change the hearts
and minds of Americans. People reported declining levels of
racism and increasing interracial contact at school and in the
workplace.7 Rates of interracial marriage also climbed steadily.8
In many ways, the model of racial animus that animated Brown
seemed to be growing obsolete. Incidents of virulent racism were
seen as aberrations, vestiges of an earlier era that were
universally condemned. 9 Yet, even with these reported gains in
racial tolerance and understanding, residential segregation has
remained a commonplace feature of American life, and
significant gaps in educational attainment, earnings, and wealthpersist between White and non-White Americans.10 As a result,
many activists argue that civil rights remedies remain as vital
and relevant today as they were when Brown was decided."1
For legal scholars, the decades after Brown have posed adilemma. Race-conscious remedies have been used for decades,
and the evil of racism that they addressed seems to be in decline.Yet, racial inequality remains a robust feature of American lifeby nearly any commonly accepted measure of well-being. How
5 See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 90-91 (1979)(describing President Eisenhower's deployment of the National Guard to enforce a
school desegregation order in Little Rock).
6 See Wilhelmina M. Wright, Brown's Legacy: Looking Back, Moving Forward,31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 375, 378 (2004); see also ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 4.7 See, e.g., THE GALLUP ORG. FOR AARP, CIVIL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS5-8, 70-78 (2004), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/
civil-rights.pdf.
8 See RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE
AND ROMANCE 103-09 (2001).
9 See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 36-37 (2003). But cf. Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and theRelationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U.PITT. L. REV. 389, 395-96 (2002) (describing explicitly racist corporate culture at
Texaco in the mid-1990s).
10 See BROWN ETAL., supra note 9, at 13.11 See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARDUNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THEDREAM? 12-14 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (demonstrating the variousimprovements for students today in integrated classrooms).
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can this paradoxical situation be understood, and what are its
implications for the future of civil rights remedies? Here, I would
like to look at two responses to this problem, one by law and
economics scholars and the other by critical race theorists. These
two schools of thought are often characterized as polar opposites
with little to say to one another. Yet, in the area of
discrimination, each has suggested that Brown's definition of the
wrong, that is, distaste for interracial contact, needs to be
revisited, and both wrestle with the implications for
antidiscrimination law and affirmative action. In the end,
neither scholarly approach is wholly compatible with a colorblind
jurisprudence, and the concessions to color-consciousness offer
some interesting lessons for the future of race in America.
I. LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE PARADOX OF PERSISTENT
DISCRIMINATION
For economists, rational choice lies at the heart of any
account of human behavior. As Kenneth Arrow explains,
"Rational choice theory means that the individual actors act
rationally (that is, by maximizing according to a complete
ordering) within the constraints imposed by preferences,
technology, and beliefs, and by the institutions which determine
how individual actions interact to determine outcomes."
12
Rationality is a normative ideal, but it also serves as the basis for
descriptive and predictive accounts of human behavior. 
13
During the 1950s, economists had to reconcile the realities of
racial segregation and stratification with rational choice theory.
To do so, Gary Becker posited that Whites have a taste for
discrimination, that is, an aversion to interaction with non-
Whites. As a result, Whites gain utility from avoiding interracial
contact even after discriminatory behavior has been formally
labeled antisocial.1 4  So long as the taste for discrimination
remains widespread, discrimination can persist in a competitive
market.15 Even when Becker first proposed his theory, it
12 Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?,
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 93-94 (1998).
13 See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558-61, 1575 (1998) (contending that rationality is a
desirable trait with strong predictive value and considerable descriptive accuracy).
14 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 19 (2d ed. 1971).
15 See id. at 14-15, 39-45.
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presented problems. The concept of a taste for discrimination
seemed to be tailor-made to save rational choice theory.Economists did not posit other widespread, antisocial preferences
that so powerfully trumped the quest for personal profit. AsArrow notes, "introducing new variables easily risks turning the
'explanation' into a tautology,"16 and a taste for discrimination
could operate much as phlogiston did to rescue scientific theories
already emptied of their explanatory value.
Becker's theory posed additional difficulties because the
taste for discrimination operates even when little interracial
contact is required. Employment and housing can bring theparties to a contract into close proximity, but this is not always
the case. Moreover, discriminatory behavior occurs in consumer
transactions like the sale of a car, even though these markets are
relatively impersonal.17 Finally, despite a decline in racial
animus since the 1950s, discrimination in the marketplace
persists.1s The intransigence of discrimination is a puzzle for
theorists like Becker because once people lose their taste fordiscrimination, markets should become colorblind.
Economists have offered several explanations for racialinequalities in the marketplace. In his study of retail car sales inChicago in 1991, Ian Ayres used testers to determine whetherdealerships engaged in discriminatory pricing practices.19 To
avoid confounding race and gender with other traits like
appearance, financial standing, and knowledge about car prices,Ayres controlled for the testers' dress, background, and behaviorin dealing with the sellers. 20 He discovered that salespeople
16 Arrow, supra note 12, at 95.
17 See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OFRACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 127-33 (2001) [hereinafter AYRES, PERVASIVEPREJUDICE] (discussing plaintiffs burden in proving that an automobile seller tookrace into account in the bargaining process); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender andRace Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-30(1991) [hereinafter Ayres, Fair Driving]. In a subsequent study, Ayres confirmedthat White males receive the best offers on a car, but he did not find that Blackfemales receive the worst deals. Instead, Black males were quoted the highest pricesfor a car. See Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations
and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 115-16 (1995).
18 See AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 17, at 4-6.19 See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 17, at 822-24.
20 See id. at 825. As I have argued elsewhere, these controls may be imperfect ifretail car sellers interpret statements or behavior differently when they come fromWhite men, Blacks, and women. See Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature ofDiscrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2372-75, 2383 (2003). Still, Ayres has made
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offered better deals to White males than they did to Blacks and
women. Black males were quoted the highest prices, but White
women and Black women also were asked to pay significantly
more than White men. 21
To explain these discriminatory pricing practices, Ayres had
to refine the definition of animus. In Ayres' view, animus can be
divided into two types: associational and consequential.
Associational animus is a desire to avoid interracial contact, and
it resembles the taste for discrimination that Becker described.
Consequential animus is a desire to place members of a different
race in a worse position than members of one's own race. This
version of animus relates more to subordination than
segregation. 22 According to Ayres, associational animus played
no role in discriminatory pricing practices in Chicago. As he
explains, salespeople were willing to spend considerable time
with Black customers, including Black males, to negotiate a deal.
If sellers had simply wanted to avoid interracial contact, they
would not have prolonged the bartering over price. Instead, in
Ayres' view, consequential animus accounted for the
substantially higher prices offered to Black males. That is,
salespeople wanted Black men to be in a worse position than
Whites at the end of the bargaining process.
23
Ayres offered a different explanation for the higher prices
quoted to women, whether Black or White. In the retail car
market, dealers make most of their profit by charging inflated
prices to customers with limited knowledge or weak bargaining
skills. To maximize returns, sellers "search for the sucker," the
unwitting or timid buyer who will pay too much. When a
potential customer walks into the showroom, a retailer knows
almost nothing about that person's skills and knowledge. So,
sellers rely on other traits to make quick and admittedly
imperfect judgments about whether a prospective buyer is likely
to be a sucker. Race and gender are easy to identify, and
salespeople believe these characteristics roughly correlate with
every effort to link differential pricing to race and gender, rather than other
personal characteristics.
21 See AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 17, at 28-33.
22 See id. at 59-60.
23 See id. at 68-69. Again, I take issue with this claim. Although associational
animus may not play the exclusive role in explaining differential pricing, it is
possible that it continues to play some role by discouraging Blacks, particularly
Black males, from returning to the dealership. See Moran, supra note 20, at 2370.
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sophistication and bargaining acumen. Dealers expect White
men to know more and bargain harder than other people who are
in the market for a new car. As a result, the higher prices offered
to women, whether Black or White, reflect statistical
discrimination, a belief that they are easy marks for generating
extra profit.24 By contrast, the notably higher price demanded
from Black men is based on both statistical discrimination (the
belief that this is a sucker) and consequential animus (a desire to
keep the sucker in his place).
Unlike consequential animus, statistical discrimination is a
rational strategy for dealing with limited information. This
strategy has ramifications that go well beyond retail car sales.
Employers can use race as a convenient proxy in evaluating job
candidates. Information about race is typically inexpensive to
obtain, and there may be group differences in skills and
preparation. For instance, the average level of education and
experience differs for racial groups, and the variability in
performance may differ as well. 25 Race thus becomes a powerful
tool for sorting candidates, leading employers to prefer Whites
over non-Whites when granting interviews and offering jobs.
Once on the job, non-Whites realize that in a world of limited
information, they labor in the shadow of race-based judgments
about their promise. As a result, non-White employees choose
between a high-risk strategy to establish themselves as
superstars or a low-risk approach to minimize the chance of
failure. Each course of action can backfire if the risk-taker
appears foolhardy or the risk-avoider passive. 26 As a result,
statistical discrimination limits the opportunities that non-
Whites have to develop their human capital. The predicted racial
24 See AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 17, at 29, 68-69, 77-80, 84.
25 See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES: ESSAYS
THAT ENTERTAIN THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC THEORY
14-15 (1984); see also Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information, and
Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 543-44 (1996) (arguing that
discrimination in screening job applicants can occur even when employers "have no
innate preference for similar people and even when they (correctly) believe that the
distribution of quality among people of their own background is no different from the
distribution of quality among people of other backgrounds" so long as employers "can
distinguish between high- and low-character individuals more accurately when the
people being sorted are of a similar cultural type").
26 See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers
in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 574-80
(1996).
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gap becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In addition to explaining persistent discrimination by
unpacking animus and recognizing the use of race as a statistical
proxy, economists have explored the role of informal social
networks in perpetuating racial inequality. In their view, racial
inequality can be understood in part by looking beyond the
marketplace to personal connections that offer important
economic advantages. This theory reflects the commonplace
belief that people get ahead because of who they know as well as
what they know. 27 Some fortunate individuals can turn to
family, friends, and acquaintances for help in finding a job.
28
Because racial divides in income and wealth persist, non-Whites
are less apt than Whites to have the kind of contacts that open
professional and corporate doors. To the extent that social
networks remain racially homogeneous, differential access to the
well-connected perpetuates segregation in the workplace and
replicates racial inequality.
29
In sum, then, economists give relatively little weight to
animus in explaining the persistence of racially disparate
outcomes in the marketplace. These scholars focus on
mechanisms that derive from rational self-interest rather than
irrational antipathy to others. Statistical discrimination is a low-
cost strategy for processing information that is designed to
optimize the bottom line. Social networks are reliable ways of
sharing information and coordinating action based on
relationships of trust. Investments in these ties have already
been made, so job referrals become a relatively inexpensive
additional feature of the connections. The racial disparities that
result are considered unintended rather than malicious, a
byproduct of the predominance of same-race families,
friendships, and neighborhoods.
27 See Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class in America: Shadowy Lines That
Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at 11 (noting that a substantial proportion of
Americans believe that it is essential to come from a wealthy family or to know the
right people to get ahead, although a larger proportion believe that natural ability, a
good education, and hard work are key to success).
28 See Arrow, supra note 12, at 97-98; Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the
Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 119-20
(1998).
29 Arrow, supra note 12, at 97-98.
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II. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE PERVASIVENESS OF RACIAL
SUBORDINATION
The field of critical race theory is a younger and more unruly
discipline than law and economics. Because critical race
theorists want to offer a "big tent"30 to those who do scholarship
on race, common assumptions are sometimes difficult to identify.
Several key points of agreement do emerge, however, and they
stand in marked contrast to those of the law and economics
scholar. Critical race theorists presume that racism remains
commonplace. As a result, critical race theorists reject claims
that racial disparities are an accidental byproduct of otherwise
neutral practices. After centuries of oppression, race is deeply
entrenched in everyday life, and racism continues to subordinate
non-Whites. In reaching this conclusion, these scholars rely
heavily on the victims' perspective, a truth captured through
personal narrative. Unlike Ayres, race scholars reject the need to
gather extensive aggregate, statistical evidence to demonstrate
that racism is real.
Critical race theorists also question traditional civil rights
models that make individual animus a hallmark of defining the
wrong. Like some modern-day economists, race scholars want to
revisit the concept of animus, but they are unwilling to accept
any neat divide between irrational animus, whether associational
or consequential, on the one hand, and rational, statistical
discrimination on the other. Instead, race scholars focus on the
distinction between conscious and unconscious bias, presuming
that racial distinctions in whatever form represent tainted
thinking. This approach grew out of Charles Lawrence's seminal
work on The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism,31 which argues that in the wake of the civil
rights movement, old-fashioned animus is no longer the main
obstacle to racial equality. Instead, racism persists through
assumptions and attitudes that are often hidden from individual
awareness:
[M]ost of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the
30 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A
Foot in the Closing Door," 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1362-63 (2002).
31 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our
actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious
racial motivation.
32
Although Lawrence's emphasis on Freudian psychology has
largely faded away, his fundamental insight that racism can be
unconscious remains a vital component of critical race theory.
In elaborating on this claim, race scholars have turned to
cognitive psychology and the general ways in which human
beings process information. Cognitive theorists make clear that
"Because implicit prejudice arises from the ordinary and
unconscious tendency to make associations, it is distinct from
conscious forms of prejudice, such as overt racism or sexism."
33
For instance, psychologists have used an Implicit Association
Test ("IAT"') to demonstrate that implicit racial biases are strong
and pervasive even as self-reported racism declines. 34 Racial
biases, like other group biases, stem from an illusion of
objectivity, a belief that individuals are capable of being fair and
rational. In fact, unconscious biases can operate in a way that
contradicts explicit beliefs.35 These implicit biases can be costly
precisely because, at times, they contravene expressly held
commitments. Moreover, these costs can arise in "situations that
involve economically and socially important decisions, such as
hiring, educational admissions, and personnel evaluations."
3 6
Proponents of cognitive bias theory offer a different
explanation of research like Ayres' work with testers in the
Chicago retail car market. For instance, the Discrimination
Research Center sent pairs of specially trained testers to
temporary employment agencies. The testers were matched with
respect to personal characteristics, qualifications, and
interviewing behavior. Despite efforts to make the two job
applicants interchangeable, temporary employment agencies
preferred White applicants over Black applicants by a wide
32 Id. at 322.
33 Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethical Are You?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec.
2003, at 56, 58.
34 Id. at 58-59.
35 Id. at 56.
36 Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 6 (1995).
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margin. 37 These preferences manifested themselves in several
ways. Compared to Black applicants, White applicants were
more likely to be offered an interview, to get a job offer, to obtain
a placement with superior pay, benefits, and hours, and to
receive support and encouragement during the screening
process. 38 Like Ayres, the Discrimination Research Center did
not rely on conscious racism (that is, animus) to explain the
results. However, the Center also declined to invoke statistical
discrimination and instead concluded that "[b]latant
discrimination is rarely seen in testing; most discrimination is
subtle and covert, and perhaps not even conscious on the part of
the employer." 39
Statistical discrimination and implicit bias share some
similarities. Both can operate even among individuals who do
not think of themselves as racists. 40  Moreover, statistical
discrimination is a shortcut used when information is
expensive, 41 and implicit bias is most acute when individuals are
distracted and pressed for time.42 Like statistical discrimination,
implicit bias can be difficult to eradicate by fiat. Many
organizations attempt to fight discrimination with programs that
urge managers to just try harder. Yet, leading cognitive theorists
"doubt that a well-intentioned, just-try-harder approach will
fundamentally improve the quality of executives' decision
making."43  After all, implicit bias is not the product of a
character flaw, but an ingrained way of processing information.
For proponents of both statistical discrimination and
37 JENNY BUSSEY & JOHN TRASVINA, DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH CTR., RACIAL
PREFERENCES: THE TREATMENT OF WHITE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN JOB APPLICANTS
BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA 8 (2003).
38 Id. at 5, 11-12.
39 Id. at 4. The Discrimination Research Center reached similar conclusions
when it studied how temporary employment agencies process resumes in Los
Angeles and San Francisco. Once again, there were differences in the success rate of
applicants based on race and ethnicity, even when their qualifications were similar.
For Black applicants, class differences also had a significant effect. The researchers
attributed the disparities to stereotyped views of the candidates. See generally
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH CTR., NAMES MAKE A DIFFERENCE: THE SCREENING OF
RESUMES BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA (2004), available
at http://drcenter.org/staticdata/pdfs/name-resume-study.pdf.
40 Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 36, at 15.
41 See Thomas A. Cunniff, The Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of
Title VIIAfter Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507, 516 (1995).
42 See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 36, at 18.
43 Banaji et al., supra note 33, at 61.
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cognitive bias, antidiscrimination laws that emphasize animus
largely miss the point. However, those who rely on theories of
statistical discrimination focus on the rationality of the
judgments, which are a response to the problem of limited
information. Racial heuristics work precisely because race is
correlated with other relevant traits. In particular, race
continues to mark significant gaps in skills and training. By
contrast, cognitive theorists insist that implicit bias is a
damaging vestige of racial animus. This bias reflects a tension
"between feelings and beliefs associated with a sincerely
egalitarian value system and unacknowledged negative feelings
and beliefs about blacks."44 The question for cognitive theorists
is how civil rights remedies can combat this habitual and
distorted racial stereotyping.
Cognitive bias theorists expand the concept of discrimination
by reconceptualizing race-based individual thought and behavior.
Other race scholars, however, urge a focus on institutional
racism, the collective patterns and practices that entrench
inequality. According to this view, race is a social construction
highly relevant to our lives, not a personal trait that should be
ignored in a colorblind society. As Ian Haney Lopez explains:
[H]uman interaction rather than natural differentiation must
be seen as the source and continued basis for racial
categorization .... [R]ace is not a determinant or a residue of
some other social phenomenon, but rather stands on its own as
an amalgamation of competing societal forces. Racial formation
includes both the rise of racial groups and their constant
reification in social thought.45
Haney Lopez argues that "ideas about race form part of the
whole social fabric into which other relations, among them
gender and class, are also woven."46 The very pervasiveness of
racial assumptions and practices means that individuals can
engage in highly discriminatory conduct, even as they think of
themselves as colorblind. The explanation resides not in
unconscious bias but in a set of institutional scripts and paths
44 Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 62 (1986).
45 Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1994).
46 Id. at 30.
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that perpetuate racial subordination. 47
As an example, Haney Lopez draws on grand jury selection
practices in Los Angeles in the late 1960s. Statistical evidence
conclusively demonstrated that Mexican Americans were
severely underrepresented in the jury pool, yet the judges who
nominated jurors insisted that they did not discriminate. 48
Haney Lopez explains this seeming paradox by arguing that the
judges were trapped in patterns of institutional racism.49 Judges
picked members of the pool from among their friends and
associates, assuming that these individuals would be best
qualified for service. None of the jurists worried that the social
circles they frequented were highly exclusionary. Without any
trace of malice, the judges used a selection process that largely
prevented Mexican Americans from participating in grand jury
proceedings. 50 The force of institutional habit proved so powerful
that even when judges were warned about the dangers of
underrepresentation, they persisted in choosing jurors in the
same way. The longstanding practice of identifying grand jurors
from among friends and acquaintances continued to seem
legitimate despite the evident difficulties it created. 51
To a certain extent, Haney Lopez's account resembles the
discussion of social networks that proponents of law and
economics sometimes invoke. Yet, for Haney Lopez, the key
concern is how institutions embody racist practices by
establishing scripts and paths that guide individual behavior, not
the descriptive reality of segregated friendships. The key script
here is one of "pick your friends," which is race-neutral on its
face, yet has highly disparate consequences for Mexican
Americans. The racial homogeneity of friendships is the
mechanism by which this script becomes exclusionary, but Haney
Lopez would argue that the script enjoys its normative legitimacy
precisely because it rests on notions of merit and inclusion that
are highly racialized. So, it is not merely the existence of
segregated social networks, but their deployment to legitimate
institutionalized practices that interests Haney Lopez.
47 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1781-83 (2000).
48 See id. at 1743-44, 1757-61.
49 See id. at 1812.
50 See id. at 1819-22.
51 See id. at 1820.
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In short, then, critical race theorists, like economists, have
increasingly turned away from conscious animus as the primary
explanation for ongoing racial disparities. Unlike economists,
however, race scholars reject accounts that treat persistent
inequality as a byproduct of otherwise rational shortcuts and
innocent personal relationships. According to critical race
theory, both individual cognition and social structures remain
tainted by the legacy of racism. Race is readily available as a
mark of inferiority because of this history, and institutional
patterns and practices seem familiar and appropriate because
they reflect and replicate racial difference.
III. REMAKING LAW AND POLICY: THE LESSONS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY
Clearly, the fields of law and economics and critical race
theory have adopted different approaches to understanding
contemporary racial inequality. Yet, both schools of thought
concur that old-style animus, standing alone, cannot explain the
persistence of discrimination and subordination. As a result,
scholars from each discipline have revisited traditional civil
rights remedies, which largely equate discrimination with racial
antipathy. Even if antidiscrimination laws should continue to
target animus, economists and critical race theorists have asked
whether more should be done to reach statistical discrimination,
segregated social networks, unconscious bias, and institutional
practices that perpetuate racial differences. Not surprisingly,
the answers have been complex and at times contradictory,
revealing the profound uncertainty that surrounds the future of
racial justice in America.
A. Retooling Antidiscrimination Law and Affirmative Action: A
Law and Economics Perspective
For proponents of law and economics, there is no doubt that
the irrational taste for prejudice should be eradicated. Disparate
treatment laws, which prohibit discrimination motivated by an
invidious racial purpose, are largely uncontroversial. The real
question is whether, with the decline in animus, these laws have
largely served their purpose and are now obsolete. 52 As George
52 See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411,
1421-30 (1986); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21
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Rutherglen has remarked, "[t]he descriptive, let alone the
progressive, force of the concept [of discrimination] has been
exhausted."53 As a result, for proponents of law and economics,
disparate treatment law is justified but rarely necessary today.
In general, once freed from the distortions of irrational prejudice,
markets can be trusted to operate efficiently.
For economists, the decline in animus casts doubt on the
legitimacy of two other civil rights remedies: disparate impact
laws and affirmative action. Disparate impact claims reach
facially neutral conduct that has the effect of generating racial
disparities. 54 For instance, a screening test with differential pass
rates for Whites and non-Whites generates a disparate impact in
hiring.55 If non-White applicants who fail the test challenge its
use, the employer must demonstrate that the test is in fact job-
related and a business necessity. 56 In a world in which animus
remains a significant problem, disparate impact analysis can
ferret out invidious racial subterfuge that is otherwise hard to
prove. If animus has largely disappeared, however, this
approach imposes a tax on employers who rationally choose a test
but bear special costs of justification because it has racially
disparate effects.
The decline in animus also calls into question the rationale
for affirmative action programs. Such programs may be
appropriate in the short run to remedy past discrimination by a
particular institution or perhaps even to correct widespread
societal discrimination. However, once racial antipathy has
declined, economists doubt whether the government should
second-guess market decisions about hiring and productivity. As
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 493-94 (2000). However, a few economists
challenge disparate treatment laws altogether, on efficiency grounds. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 181, 265-66 (1992) (rejecting the efficiency of protections
against disparate treatment as well as disparate impact); Richard A. Epstein,
Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 54-56 (1994)
(defending his position that employment discrimination protections should be
largely eliminated).
53 George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117,
146 (1995).
54 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
55 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 627 (1979); Elaine W.
Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under
Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 793-94 (1978).
56 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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a result, economists would oppose compulsory affirmative action
programs as inefficient. 57  Voluntary affirmative action
programs, by contrast, presumably reflect an employer's
judgment that racial inclusion advances business objectives.
Therefore, economists would not be averse to such initiatives, as
long as they are not coerced by government in any way.58 To
preserve room for official support of affirmative action, some
economic analysts have relied on the need to build social capital
across racial lines. These arguments rest on a belief that
government must counter the ongoing effects of segregation of
family ties and friendships, even if these patterns are not a
product of racial hatred.
1. Statistical Discrimination, Disparate Impact, and
Accommodation
To explain why racial disparities persist in the absence of
animus, economists have relied on the concept of statistical
discrimination. That is, people use race as a convenient proxy for
other traits, such as training and skills, and this strategy is a
rational response to the high cost of individualized evaluation.
For the economist who prizes market rationality, there is some
real doubt as to whether this conduct is antisocial or unethical,
even if it inflicts group-based disadvantage. 59  Nevertheless,
disparate impact law imposes special burdens on employers
whose practices generate racial disparities, even in the absence
of evidence of discriminatory intent.
Christine Jolls questions whether disparate impact law is
justified.60 In her view, this legal safeguard can not be explained
57 See George Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and
Consequences of Ending Preferences in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 346-
52; Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 95 (2002).
58 See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133,
144-50 (1994) (arguing that either mandating or forbidding affirmative action
constitutes bureaucratized, command-and-control legislation that interferes with
free market solutions); Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, Separating Myth from
Reality: An Economic Analysis of Voluntary Affirmative Action Programs, 23
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 773, 781 (1993) (highlighting the success of voluntary
affirmative action programs); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency,
and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1296-308 (1995) (arguing
that employers may adopt voluntary affirmative action for efficiency reasons).
59 Stephen Maitzen, The Ethics of Statistical Discrimination, 17 SOc. THEORY &
PRAC. 23, 39-40 (1991).
60 See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
as a way to ferret out hidden cases of invidious intent. 61 On the
contrary, Jolls asserts that disparate impact laws are
tantamount to an accommodation or affirmative action
requirement because employers must
incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs (as
measured against existing market structures) of particular,
identifiable demographic groups of employees, such as
individuals with (observable) disabilities, and [the law] imposes
this requirement in circumstances in which the employer has no
intention of treating the group in question differently on the
basis of group membership (or "discriminating against" the
group in the canonical sense).62
Jolls believes that disparate impact, accommodation, and
affirmative action force employers to depart from acting
rationally by ignoring traits that are relevant to profitability. 63
Although Jolls refrains from condemning disparate impact law
outright, she insists that it must be supported on grounds other
than the eradication of irrational animus. She also points out
that critical race theorists committed to anti-subordination--or
group equality-would be unperturbed by her observations. 64
To the extent that statistical discrimination generates racial
disparities in today's marketplace, economists will question the
propriety of disparate impact law unless some strong alternative
grounds can be offered to justify the tax on a firm's efficiency. To
address these concerns, Mark Kelman weighs the collective
interest of previously excluded racial groups in integration
against the employer's goal of profit-maximization. 65  Kelman
agrees that "claims for reasonable accommodations.., are very
difficult to distinguish, as distributive claims, from the claims of
those who are viewed as 'justly' disadvantaged in a market
economy."66 In either case, accommodation means some loss of
efficiency and profit-maximization. For Kelman, this tax on
HARv. L. REV. 642 (2001).
61 Id. at 652-54.
62 Id. at 648.
63 See id. at 687.
64 See id. at 686-87.
65 See generally Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 833 (2001) (exploring the idea that an employee's demand to a right of
"accommodation" is subject to claims that such a demand is unreasonable because
the resources necessary to satisfy such a right could be spent in a better, more
efficient fashion).
66 Id. at 881.
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profit-maximizing behavior is appropriate only when
accommodation is necessary to avoid the creation of "an outsider
caste."67 Under these circumstances, accommodation becomes a
legitimate means of addressing segregation and its harms-
collective injuries unlikely to be fully accounted for in any
individual calculation of profit-maximization. Kelman believes
that, over the long run, accommodation yields valuable societal
gains for all concerned. 68 Members of the dominant group enjoy
access to diverse perspectives, a benefit which shatters the
illusion that their own experience is universal, while members of
the subordinate group are granted the opportunity to develop
diverse contacts and escape the stigma of isolation. 69 These long-
term gains are apt to be overlooked in business assessments of
short-term profitability.
For economists, then, once the eradication of animus is
unavailable as a normative justification for civil rights laws,
some other societal values must be produced to account for the
interference with the efficient operation of market forces. Both
group equality and group inclusion have been proffered as
justifications for preserving civil rights protections that go
beyond disparate treatment. What remains to be seen, however,
is whether any of these rationales will generate the kind of
societal consensus that the crusade against irrational racial
prejudice commanded.
2. Affirmative Action and Social Capital
Just as economic theorists doubt the propriety of disparate
impact requirements, they worry that affirmative action compels
employers to engage in inefficient behavior by subsidizing
previously disadvantaged groups. Economists may agree that
affirmative action is a legitimate short-term remedy for an
institution's own past invidious misconduct, or even for
widespread, contemporary prejudice. Once such harms have
been rectified, though, economists would generally prefer to leave
firms free to make their own decisions about hiring, promotions,
and layoffs. Each business would have to decide whether
affirmative action advances its particular business objectives. A
firm could voluntarily adopt such programs, but the government
67 Id. at 891.
68 See id. at 885.
69 See id.
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would not mandate or encourage them. 70
Not all scholars agree that as animus declines, affirmative
action becomes a matter for business judgment. In their view,
there is a societal interest in using affirmative action to
counteract the exclusionary effects of segregated social networks.
For example, Clark Cunningham, Glenn Loury, and John David
Skrentny argue that affirmative action dispels the lingering
effects of discrimination-particularly the unequal access to
social capital. 71 As a result, the federal government should map
access to social capital so that affirmative action programs can be
narrowly tailored to address racial disparities. 72 Although the
prospects for such mapping appear remote, this proposal is
significant because it moves beyond the behavior of individuals
and firms to consider how social structures affect market
opportunities.
In a related vein, Cynthia Estlund has addressed the role of
the workplace in generating social capital.7 3 In her view, "the
workplace is the single most important site of cooperative
interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the
family."74 The job is an especially significant place for interracial
contact, given the pervasive residential segregation that
characterizes much of the United States.75  Moreover, the
employment setting offers a safe and structured environment in
which to interact with members of other races because it is
diverse, and governed by a principle of non-discrimination. As
Estlund explains, "[i]n the workplace, and often only there,
citizens must find ways of cooperating on an ongoing basis, over
weeks or years, outside of and often counter to traditional racial,
ethnic, or sexual hierarchies. '" 76
Because Estlund sees the job as a critical place for the
development of social capital, she justifies affirmative action in
70 See Selmi, supra note 58, at 1308-12.
71 See Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury & John David Skrentny, Passing
Strict Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO.
L.J. 835, 841-43 (2002).
72 See id. at 878-82.
73 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil
Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (discussing the workplace and its
relationship to the development of social capital).
74 Id. at 3.
75 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60-82 (1998).
76 Estlund, supra note 73, at 4.
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employment as a means by which to undo racially exclusionary
networks. 77 In her view, programs are appropriate only to the
extent that they build positive interracial contacts, and
initiatives leading to interracial resentment, hostility, and
stereotyping should be abandoned.78  Estlund favors racial
preferences in hiring that are modest and flexible because they
will be "relatively invisible and nonthreatening" to White
employees, and worries about the divisive effect of racial
preferences during layoffs.7 9 Estlund concedes that her approach
allows "integration efforts [to be held] hostage to racial
resentment" and that the "diffuse societal benefits [will be] hard
to demonstrate in particular cases."80  Estlund's analysis
demonstrates the normative uncertainty that can arise once
affirmative action is used as a forward-looking strategy, rather
than a backward-looking remedy for an actor's past
discrimination. Building social capital is an uncertain enterprise
that turns on the goodwill of all parties concerned. The dominant
group must relinquish some of its privileges, while the
subordinate group must transcend distrust and distance. Artful
organizational practices are crucial to the success of these efforts,
yet they are difficult to mandate precisely because of the wide
range of institutional histories, cultures, and practices at
different workplaces.8 1
B. Disparate Treatment and Institutional Racism: Lessons from
Critical Race Theory
Race scholars face distinct challenges in addressing the
future of civil rights remedies. Critical race theorists are
convinced that racism remains a deeply entrenched part of
American life. At an individual level, this pervasive racism
manifests itself not so much in conscious animus but in
unconscious bias. For that reason, disparate treatment law,
which targets discriminatory intent, is far from obsolete.
However, the definition of illicit purpose must be changed to
17 See id. at 79-88.
78 See id. at 88-89.
79 Id. at 89-90.
80 Id. at 92-93.
81 See, e.g., Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The
Effects of Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 229, 229-70 (2001) (identifying three different views of workforce diversity
and evaluating their implications for realizing the benefits of diversity).
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include unconscious racism. Moreover, affirmative action can
counter implicit bias by affording individuals an opportunity to
work cooperatively in an interracial setting.
Some critical race theorists contend that civil rights law
should target institutional as opposed to individual racism.
Here, the aim is to move beyond sanctions for race-conscious
practices and to reach seemingly race-neutral organizational
paths and scripts that perpetuate subordination. Because this
approach departs radically from the traditional emphasis on not
only animus but also individual action, the challenges of
implementation are formidable. Any effort to dismantle
institutional racism requires a clear vision of how to link the
restructuring of organizational practice to distributive justice,
and redistributive goals would have to trump interests in
institutional autonomy. So far, critical race theorists have
explored institutional racism mainly through descriptive case
studies, but their work has yet to confront decisively the
daunting normative dilemmas of remediation. The area of
corporate law could be ripe for an exploration of institutional
racism. The corporate form has already been thoroughly
theorized, and extensive empirical research has been done on
business practices. Yet, the polarization of critical race theory
from law and economics has left the racial implications of this
work largely unexamined.
1. Unconscious Bias, Disparate Treatment, and Affirmative
Action
Because critical race theorists emphasize the pervasiveness
of implicit bias, they question the efficacy of discrimination laws
that target conscious animus. Rather than abandon disparate
treatment law as obsolete, race scholars believe that its
protection must be expanded to prohibit conduct rooted in
implicit bias. According to Linda Hamilton Krieger,
antidiscrimination law should recognize "mixed-motives" that
stem from a combination of express beliefs and implicit
stereotypes.8 2 Courts have been receptive to a mixed-motive
82 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1223 (1995); see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessonsfrom Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2002); Martha
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
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approach in addressing claims based on gender and age because
judges do not treat these forms of discrimination as the product
of deep-seated animosity. Instead, false stereotypes about
women and the elderly interfere with objective individualized
evaluations. The law must root out these mistaken notions about
gender or age, whether they operate consciously or
unconsciously.8 3 In the field of race, by contrast, the goal has
been to implement corrective justice for past wrongs,
transgressions that grew out of profound hostility and distrust.
Precisely because disparate treatment connotes deeply antisocial
conduct, labeling unconscious stereotypes as a form of racism
seems harsh and excessive. To invoke the moral outrage that
corrective justice requires, courts must find animus rather than a
mere cognitive mistake.
8 4
On occasion, courts have found that implicit racial bias can
serve as the basis for a disparate treatment claim. In Thomas v.
Eastman Kodak Co.,8 5 the plaintiff was the only Black customer
service representative in one of Eastman Kodak's offices. When
she was laid off, she challenged her employer's decision as
discriminatory because it used a ranking method that
incorporated racially biased performance appraisals done in the
three years preceding her termination.8 6 In finding that the
plaintiff had a triable claim of disparate treatment, the Court of
Appeals noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized
that unlawful discrimination can stem from stereotypes and
other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious
animus."87  After discussing age and gender discrimination
decisions, the court noted that "[s]tereotypes or cognitive biases
based on race are as incompatible with Title VII's
[antidiscrimination] mandate as stereotypes based on age or sex;
here too, 'the entire spectrum of disparate treatment' is
prohibited."88
Redefining the meaning of disparate treatment is not the
only way to fight unconscious bias. Structural changes can avoid
the unfairness of blaming individuals for conduct that is
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 782 (2001).
83 See Krieger, supra note 82, at 1168-71.
84 See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1220 (1999).
85 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
86 See id. at 45-46.
87 Id. at 59.
88 Id.
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automatic, unconscious, and widespread. Moreover, these
changes may be more efficacious than exhorting individuals to
behave better when they have little control over their cognitive
habits.8 9 The goal of dispelling unconscious bias provides a
distinct justification for affirmative action, which should be
understood "not only as compensation to a stigmatized group for
past explicit discrimination by others who intended to
discriminate against them, but also as compensation for past,
present, and likely future implicit discrimination by persons who
have no intent to discriminate."90 According to this view,
affirmative action can reshape workplace environments in ways
that reduce implicit bias. Placing members of underrepresented
groups in positions that demonstrate their competence and
authority counters negative associations and stereotypes. 91 By
reconfiguring the workplace, affirmative action reconstructs the
way that people think about race, both consciously and
unconsciously.
Some scholars have used implicit bias not only to justify
existing civil rights remedies but to argue for new reforms. For
example, Cheryl L. Wade has proposed that the Securities and
Exchange Commission mandate disclosure of information
regarding a company's hiring and promotion of non-White
employees. 92  She argues that "mandatory disclosure of
employment-related facts would help corporate managers deterdiscriminatory behavior in their firms because it would provide
an important opportunity for self-examination."93 Wade believes
that when managers conduct due diligence investigations to
comply with the disclosure requirement, subtle discriminatory
conduct could be revealed. In making this claim, she relies
heavily on the prevalence of unconscious bias:
While racism may be carefully veiled by subtle, discrete, or
disguised discriminatory behavior, many discriminatory
practices result from unconscious bias. The self-examination
that would be required in order to accurately disclose
employment-related matters may help managers recognize and
89 See Wax, supra note 84, at 1158-69. Indeed, Wax indicates that any effort to
treat implicit bias as a form of disparate treatment is desirable largely as a means to
encourage firms to adopt diversity programs. See id. at 1226-31.
90 Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 36, at 19.
91 See Banaji et al., supra note 33, at 63.
92 See Wade, supra note 9, at 410-16.
93 Id. at 416.
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expose the unconscious racial bias that often impedes the
progress of minority employees and the retainment of minority
suppliers. The fact remains, however, that self-examination
will not enable corporate managers to uncover unconscious
racism unless they have sufficient reason to believe that
unconscious discriminatory conduct is likely to occur, even in
their firm.94
In Wade's view, mandatory disclosure of statistics on the racial
composition of the workforce is uniquely justified because
unconscious racism is an especially intractable problem.
95
Some of the research on implicit bias casts doubt on the
efficacy of Wade's proposal. Cognitive theorists have suggested
that data collection can reduce unconscious prejudice by
revealing its presence. However, aggregate statistics on the
composition of the workforce may not be enough. To combat
implicit bias, the data should be surprising to many people, so
that the results counter "the 'statistics' our intuition provides."
96
It is not clear that a report on the underrepresentation of people
of color in the corporate workplace would be counterintuitive. As
an alternative, cognitive theorists suggest audits of individual
and group decision-making. For example, individual employees
might take the Implicit Association Test to determine whether
they are subject to implicit bias, and in group settings, employees
might be asked to acknowledge the contributions of others before
claiming too much credit for themselves. 97 Nor is it clear that
data collection should be limited in the way that Wade proposes.
Far from being unique to race, implicit bias appears to operate
for a number of other categories, including gender and age.
98 As
a result, arguments for confining mandatory disclosure to racial
statistics would have to rest on a justification other than the
exceptional nature of unconscious bias. Still, Wade's pioneering
efforts are important because they test whether the work on
implicit bias has significant policy implications outside of the
94 Id. at 417 (footnote omitted).
95 See id. at 426.
96 Banaji et al., supra note 33, at 62.
97 See id.
98 See Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272, 278-79 (1993) (showing implicit gender bias
under various experimental conditions); Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit
Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMIcS:
THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101, 105-09 (2002) (documenting implicit biases for race, age,
and gender).
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traditional civil rights paradigm.
2. Institutional Racism and a Radical Critique of Corporate
Personhood
Proponents of implicit bias primarily seek to expand the
existing civil rights model by insisting that not all prejudice is
conscious. Scholars who focus on institutional racism
contemplate a radical and far-ranging critique of traditional
remedies for racial injustice. By moving beyond the blameworthy
individual, these critical race theorists hope to unmask the
everyday structures and practices that perpetuate subordination.
The form and operation of corporations might seem to be an area
ripe for examination based on theories of institutional racism.
Yet, little of this work has been done, in part because law and
economics has been seen as wholly distinct and even polarized
from critical race theory. 99 As a result, most of the discussions of
race in the corporate setting have focused on employment
discrimination without addressing other features of the
corporation that entrench racial inequality. 100
There is much work to be done on this front. First, race
scholars could fruitfully explore the complex history of
personhood in American law. The Constitution readily
acquiesced in the institution of slavery, which denied Blacks full
personhood. 10 1 It took a bloody Civil War to emancipate slaves,
and even then, the rise of Jim Crow diminished Black
personhood well into the twentieth century. 102  Meanwhile,
corporations gained recognition as persons relatively easily.
Anglo-American law began to use personhood as a tool for
defining non-human entities, particularly townships and free
cities, as early as the fourteenth century. 103 Moreover, when the
99 See Wade, supra note 9, at 394 ("Until now, the discourse on race, and
considerations of corporate responsibility and lawfulness have occurred in
disaffiliated contexts.").
100 See generally Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 955 (2005).
101 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, amend.
XVI (stating that all persons not deemed free persons were counted only as three-
fifths of a person for purposes of determining taxes and apportioning representatives
for the House of Representatives).
102 See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d
ed. 1974) (chronicling the legal abolition of slavery and its inability to completely
emancipate Blacks from the handicaps of segregation).
103 Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational
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United States embarked on substantial industrialization in the
late 1800s and early 1900s, courts readily adapted to these
developments by according the status of persons to burgeoning
corporations. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment, a post-Civil
War amendment designed to accord rights and protections to
former slaves, was mostly used to reinforce the entitlements of
corporations as persons. As Justice Hugo Black noted in 1938:
This Amendment sought to prevent discrimination by the
states against classes or races .... Yet, of the cases in this
Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied during
the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of 1 per
cent. invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more than
50 per cent. asked that its benefits be extended to
corporations. 104
Interestingly, beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court's references
to corporate personhood waned, just at the moment that the
Amendment was reinvigorated as an instrument of racial justice.
It seems likely that the rise of the civil rights movement revealed
how legal personhood had devolved into an abstraction that
masked the dehumanization of non-Whites. Once the Fourteenth
Amendment was again enlisted in the service of its intended
beneficiaries, the status of corporations as persons arguably grew
increasingly anomalous. 10 5  Sharp contrasts in the role of
personhood to promote racial equality on the one hand and to
expand capital markets on the other could make for a fascinating
critical race history. 106
This history could lay the foundation for exploring how the
"Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 616-17 (1989).
104 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (questioning whether corporations should be treated as persons); see also
David Graver, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 235-36 (1999) ("Near the turn of the century, the
Court granted corporations the equal protection and due process rights accorded
persons under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.").
105 See Graver, supra note 104, at 240 (arguing that after 1960, the Supreme
Court ceased to theorize about whether corporations were persons and instead
focused pragmatically on the impact that constitutional protections for corporations
would have on natural persons); see generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW 26-27 (1976) (describing how legal abstractions become masks
that conceal the identity and impact on individuals who make, enforce, and obey the
law).
106 For a preliminary effort to compare these applications of personhood, see
Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749-52 (2001).
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corporate form in turn influences practices that entrench racial
subordination. Ironically, the very term "institutional racism"
may acquiesce in an anthropomorphic image of the corporation.
After all, the notion that an institution can be racist seems to
suggest a capacity for malice. In this sense, institutional racism
harkens back to earlier efforts to reform corporations by drawing
on their status as persons. In the early nineteenth century,
when the destructive force of large enterprises became clear,
legal scholars argued that corporations were not merely fictive
creatures of the state but real entities that should be subject to
civil and criminal liability.1 07  Similarly, some race scholars
suggest that businesses are organic collectivities that can be
morally responsible in their own right, as distinct from their
constituent individual members. The reparations movement
arguably has adopted this approach insofar as it targets
corporations for liability in conjunction with past practices
related to slavery, even though the individuals who made the
decisions are long dead.108
Corporate law scholars have themselves questioned images
of personhood, but the dominant response has been to
characterize corporations as nothing more than a nexus of
efficient contracts dedicated to the maximization of shareholder
107 See Hager, supra note 103, at 579-82, 585-87.
108 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the
Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 308-11 (2003). Kent
Greenfield's call to revive the ultra vires doctrine in the service of racial justice
harkens back to an earlier conception of corporate personhood. Kent Greenfield,
Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1302-04 (2001) [hereinafter Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives.]; see generally Adam J.
Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of
Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for
Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929 (2005). Because
corporations were creatures of the state, acts that fell outside of a government-
authorized charter were ultra vires. As a result, the corporation could not be heldliable because it lacked the agency to perform these acts. See Hager, supra note 103,
at 593. At the turn of the century, the ravages of rapid industrialization convinced
leading legal scholars that this model of personhood offered little in the way of
meaningful protection from business abuses. See id. at 585-87. Yet, Greenfield
contends that this approach still has some meaning insofar as corporate action must
be lawful. Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!, supra, at 1314-15. Because Greenfield's
reform proposal turns on a vision of the corporation that has been dismissed as
outmoded, his claim that "ultra vires lives" has received far less attention than
demands for reparations, which impose corporate accountability as though
businesses have a moral life of their own.
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wealth. This approach is surely congenial to law and economics
theorists, but it raises serious questions for critical race theorists.
Building on demands for progressive corporate law, race scholars
can show how the abstract notion of a nexus of contracts obscures
significant effects that firms have on the general social
welfare. 109 For example, Thomas W. Joo tackles the implications
of shareholder primacy for racial justice.110 He points out that
scholars have debated whether shareholders can and should play
a highly influential role in corporate governance or whether key
policy decisions are best left to corporate managers.
1
' Joo notes
that some observers have too quickly assumed that expanding
the governance role for shareholders would promote social justice
in general and racial equality in particular. In fact, he makes a
persuasive case that small shareholders would be stymied by
collective action problems and that large institutional investors
would not sacrifice profit to advance a racial agenda.'
1 2
Moreover, so long as shareholders are seen as arm's-length
stakeholders who defer to management, they may not take
responsibility for business practices with racially exclusionary
effects, even as these practices are justified by a norm of
shareholder primacy. 1
13
If, in fact, existing characterizations of the corporation mask
practices that perpetuate racial inequity, then other ways of
framing the debate can be considered."14 For example, in other
countries, corporations have important public obligations. In
Japan, large business enterprises once relied more heavily on
bank financing than on equity to support their development. As
a result, shareholder primacy is not an unquestioned norm
109 See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom-For Whom?: Feminist
Legal Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 92
(2004).
110 See generally Joo, supra note 100.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
114 In evaluating these alternative frameworks, critical race theorists can build
on and contribute to the efforts of those who call for progressive corporate law.
Progressive corporate scholars have largely devoted themselves to critiquing the
dominant model of the corporation, and they now must develop a set of normative
prescriptions. To do so, some theorists hope to draw inspiration from other
progressive legal discourses. See, e.g., Testy, supra note 109, at 89 (drawing on
feminist legal theory as a source of normative prescriptions for progressive corporate
law).
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there. 115  Corporate governance is responsive to multiple
stakeholders, so that business decisions "maximize shareholder
profits while maintaining employment for the corporation's
employees and maintaining a level of corporate responsibility for
social affairs."116  Germany's system of co-determination also
forces corporate managers to be accountable to employees as well
as shareholders. Unlike businesses in the United States,
German firms have downsized primarily through attrition and
early retirement rather than layoffs, an approach that minimizes
economic disruptions for workers. 117 Claire Moore Dickerson
uses her comparative analysis of women entrepreneurs in West
Africa and the United States to reflect on the responsibilities
that corporations have as a part of communities and not merely a
nexus of contracts. 118 As she explains,
[C]omparative analysis offers us the clear opportunity to ask
foundational questions: why does society allow managers,
through the public corporations, to use citizens' wealth? Should
society demand a quid pro quo for that tremendous advantage,
in addition to shareholders' right to participate in the
vicissitudes of the corporation's business, and if so, what should
the quid pro quo be? 119
Along with critical race histories and inquiries into corporate
structure and practice, a global perspective promises important
insights for scholars who hope to unmask the culture-bound
assumptions that make racial inequality seem both natural and
inevitable in the business world.
115 See Janis Sarra & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Balancing Social and Corporate
Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese Corporate Structure andNorms, 24 LAW & POLY 299, 306, 336-40 (2002); Cheryl L. Wade, Commentary,
Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany, and Canada: What Can the U.S. LearnFrom Other Countries?, 24 LAW & POL'Y 441, 442 (2002) [hereinafter Wade,
Commentary]; Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women andPeople of Color, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 213, 235 (2003) [hereinafter Wade, The
Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy].
116 Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy, supra note 115, at 235.
117 See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany, Inc. " The Politics of Company
Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 LAW & POL'Y 355,
362-63 (2002); Wade, Commentary, supra note 115, at 442-43; Wade, The Impact of
U.S. Corporate Policy, supra note 115, at 235.
118 Claire Moore Dickerson, Sex and Capital: What They Tell Us About
Ourselves, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1161 (2005).
119 Id. at 1184.
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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO RACISM?
CONCLUSION
Today, there seems to be a consensus that old-fashioned
racism is on the decline. The very success of civil rights remedies
has been the undoing of their traditional justification as a way to
eradicate animus. For many, the racial divide looms large and
unbridgeable, however pure the motives of those on the
privileged side of the color line. Segregation and inequality
remain a pervasive feature of everyday life, and the perplexing
question is whether law can reach this social problem without a
bigot to blame. Civil rights law is at a crossroads in its search for
alternative explanations and strategies. Though the answers are
distinct, both economists and critical race theorists have been
willing to move beyond animus to account for racial disparities
and to tailor remedies accordingly. Only time will tell whether
our constitutional law and culture are similarly prepared to
embrace these ideas as a way to reinvigorate the quest for racial
justice.
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